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A D M I R A LT Y
Are Punitive Damages Available When a Seaman Sues for Unseaworthiness?
CASE AT A GLANCE
Seamen who are injured or the estate of a seaman killed on the job typically file a three-count complaint
against their employers for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness. The
Supreme Court has held that punitive damages can be awarded for maintenance and cure but not for
Jones Act negligence. Now, it must decide where unseaworthiness fits.

The Dutra Group v. Batterton
Docket No. 18-266
Argument Date: March 25, 2019
From: The Ninth Circuit
by Robert M. Jarvis
Nova Southeastern University College of Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL

INTRODUCTION
Seamen who are injured or the estate of a seaman killed on
the job typically ile a three-count complaint against their
employers for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and
unseaworthiness. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19
(1990), the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 30104, prohibits nonpecuniary damages. Because punitive
damages are nonpecuniary, they are unavailable under the Jones
Act. (Pecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for his or her
losses. Punitive damages are nonpecuniary because they punish
the defendant without reference to the plaintiff’s losses.)
Following Miles, lower courts split over whether punitive damages
were available with respect to maintenance and cure claims. In
Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the
Court held that they were, distinguishing Miles in a 5–4 opinion
by Justice Clarence Thomas. The same split now has emerged with
respect to unseaworthiness claims.

ISSUE
Can a court award punitive damages to a seaman who is injured or
killed due to a ship’s unseaworthiness?

metal hatch cover blew open, crushing Batterton’s left hand and
leaving him with permanent injuries. At the time of the accident,
the compartment lacked an exhaust mechanism. Had it had
one, the mishap would have been avoided because the exhaust
mechanism would have relieved the pressure before it got too
high.
On October 2, 2014, Batterton sued TDG in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. In his
complaint, Batterton asserted claims for maintenance and
cure, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness. As part of his
unseaworthiness claim, Batterton asked for punitive damages.
On November 3, 2014, TDG moved to have Batterton’s demand for
punitive damages struck. According to TDG, such damages are
unavailable under federal maritime law. For support, TDG cited
Miles and McBride v. Estis Well Service, LLC, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.
2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
On December 15, 2014, Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh denied
TDG’s motion. See Batterton v. Dutra Group, 2014 WL 12538172
(C.D. Cal. 2014). Relying on Townsend and Evich v. Morris, 819
F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987), Judge Walsh
wrote:

FACTS
On August 30, 2014, Christopher Batterton, a resident of Buena
Park, California, was employed as a deckhand by The Dutra
Group (TDG), a marine construction company headquartered in
San Rafael, California. Batterton was assigned to work on three
vessels: EM 1106, SCOW 2, and SCOW 3. The EM 1106 was an
excavator dredge; the SCOW 2 and SCOW 3 were its barges. The
trio was being used on a marina project near Balboa Park in
Newport Beach, California.
Batterton was aboard the SCOW 2 while pressurized air was being
pumped into one of its compartments. During this operation, a
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[A]s the Court sees it, Evich’s holding that punitive
damages are available in unseaworthiness claims under
general maritime law has never been expressly or
impliedly overruled. Nor is it clearly irreconcilable with
Miles or any of the Supreme Court’s other decisions
since 1987. As such, it is still good law in this circuit.
2014 WL 12538172, at *2.
On January 5, 2015, TDG requested permission to ile an
interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On February 6, 2015, Judge Walsh
certiied the appeal. On November 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit
agreed to hear it.
On January 23, 2018, the Ninth Circuit unanimously afirmed
Judge Walsh. See Batterton v. Dutra Group, 880 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir.
2018). In an opinion authored by Senior Circuit Judge Andrew J.
Kleinfeld, the panel rejected TDG’s argument that Miles prohibits
the awarding of punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases:
The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Atlantic
Sounding Co. v. Townsend speaks broadly: “Historically,
punitive damages have been available and awarded
in general maritime actions, including some in
maintenance and cure.” Unseaworthiness is a general
maritime cause of action. Townsend reads Miles as
limiting the availability of damages for loss of society
and lost future earnings and holds that Miles does not
limit the availability of punitive damages in maintenance
and cure cases. By implication, Townsend holds that
Miles does not limit the availability of remedies in other
actions “under general maritime law,” which includes
unseaworthiness claims.
Id. at 1091–92 (footnotes omitted). On May 2, 2018, the Ninth
Circuit denied TDG’s petition for rehearing.
On August 30, 2018, TDG iled a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court. On December 7, 2018, the Court agreed
to hear TDG’s appeal. See The Dutra Group v. Batterton, 139 S.
Ct. 627 (2018). On January 14, 2019, it granted TDG’s request to
dispense with printing of the joint appendix. See Dutra Group v.
Batterton, 2019 WL 177584 (U.S. 2019).

CASE ANALYSIS
Since the 19th century, a seaman injured on the job automatically
qualiies for maintenance and cure. “Maintenance” covers the
seaman’s room and board. Under “cure,” the shipowner pays for
the seaman’s medical treatment. These duties continue until the
seaman either returns to work or reaches a point of maximum
medical recovery. Only in rare instances is a shipowner able to
escape these obligations.
Also since the 19th century, an injured seaman has been able
to sue a shipowner for “unseaworthiness.” To be successful,
the seaman must show that the ship was unsafe. Because the
shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is both absolute
and nondelegable, the seaman does not need to prove that the
shipowner was negligent.
In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), the Supreme Court held
that seamen could not sue shipowners for negligence. In 1920,
Congress vitiated this holding by passing the Jones Act. As
a result, injured seamen now routinely bring a three-count
complaint for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and
unseaworthiness. Collectively, these causes of action are known as
“The Holy Trinity.”
In the same year that it passed the Jones Act, Congress
promulgated the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

§§ 30301–30308. It permits suits for the death of any person killed
on the high seas.
In Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the
Supreme Court confronted the following facts. A longshoreman
had been killed in Florida’s territorial waters. As a longshoreman,
he was not covered by the Jones Act, and because he had died in
state waters, he was not covered by DOHSA. Due to the wording of
Florida’s wrongful death act, he also was not covered by state law.
See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
Believing that Moragne’s widow should not be left remediless,
the Supreme Court held that she could sue under the general
maritime law (GML), a body of judge-made law. To reach this
conclusion, the Court overruled its decision in The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886), which had held that a maritime wrongful death
suit could not be maintained in the absence of an authorizing
statute.
These various laws and precedents collided in Miles, a case in
which a seaman was stabbed to death by a fellow crew member.
To recover for her loss, Mercedel W. Miles, the decedent’s
mother, sued the shipowner for Jones Act negligence and
unseaworthiness, arguing that the shipowner knew, or should
have known, that the attacker had a propensity for violence.
Because Miles was not economically dependent on her son, she
sought only “nonpecuniary” damages. The Court irst held that
both DOHSA and the Jones Act permit only pecuniary damages. It
then rejected Miles’s argument that nonpecuniary damages are
recoverable under the GML, reasoning that the GML must conform
to statutory maritime law:
Cognizant of the constitutional relationship between the
courts and Congress, we today act in accordance with
the uniform plan of maritime tort law Congress created
in DOHSA and the Jones Act. We hold that there is a
general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death
of a seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an
action do not include loss of society. We also hold that a
general maritime survival action cannot include recovery
for decedent’s lost future earnings.
498 U.S. at 37.
In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995)
(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1046, rehearing denied, 516 U.S.
1154 (1996), the Fifth Circuit held that punitive damages were
not available for maintenance and cure claims. In reaching this
decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on Miles:
[B]ut even if willful behavior is established, the Jones
Act does not provide for punitive damages. Under the
Miles uniformity principle, therefore, the same cause
of action under the general maritime law for the failure
to pay maintenance and cure cannot provide a punitive
recovery, even if willfulness is demonstrated.
Id. at 1512 (emphasis in original).
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Guevara was abrogated 14 years later in Townsend. According to
Justice Thomas:
Because punitive damages have long been an accepted
remedy under general maritime law, and because
nothing in the Jones Act altered this understanding,
such damages for the willful and wanton disregard of
the maintenance and cure obligation should remain
available in the appropriate case as a matter of general
maritime law. Limiting recovery for maintenance and
cure to whatever is permitted by the Jones Act would
give greater preemptive effect to the Act than is required
by its text, Miles, or any of this Court’s other decisions
interpreting the statute.
557 U.S. at 424–25 (footnote omitted).
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit, again relying on Miles, and using
the same reasoning as in Guevara, decided that punitive damages
cannot be awarded for unseaworthiness:
[T]he Court in Townsend recognized that “a seaman’s
action for maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and
‘cumulative’ from other claims such as negligence
and that the maintenance and cure right is ‘in no
sense inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the
right to recover compensatory damages [under the
Jones Act].’” The Court agreed that “both the Jones
Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are additional
to maintenance and cure: the seaman may have
maintenance and cure and also one of the other two.”
Unlike the seaman’s remedy for damages based on
negligence and unseaworthiness, “the Jones Act does
not address maintenance and cure or its remedy.”
Thus, in contrast to the action for damages based on
unseaworthiness, in an action for maintenance and cure
it is “possible to adhere to the traditional understanding
of maritime actions and remedies without abridging or
violating the Jones Act; unlike wrongful-death actions,
this traditional understanding is not a matter to which
‘Congress has spoken directly.’”
768 F.3d at 389–90 (footnotes omitted).
In Tabingo v. American Triumph, LLC, 391 P.3d 434 (Wash. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018), the Washington State Supreme
Court disagreed with McBride:
The United States Supreme Court…analyzed Miles in
Townsend.…While the Court stated that the “reasoning
of Miles remains sound,” it also noted that the reasoning
in Miles is not universally applicable. 557 U.S. at 420,
129 S.Ct. 2561. Because the cause of action in Townsend
and the remedy sought were both “well established
before the passage of the Jones Act,” and because
Congress had not spoken directly to the issue, punitive
damages for maintenance and cure were appropriate.
Id. at 420–21, 129 S.Ct. 2561. The Miles rationale did
not apply. We use that same reasoning here. Claims for
unseaworthiness predate the Jones Act and are not based
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on a statutory remedy. Further, as noted in Townsend,
the Jones Act does not directly address damages for
general maritime claims. Id. at 420, 129 S.Ct. 2561. There
is no other indication that unseaworthiness should be
excluded from the general maritime rule. Because of
this, Miles does not restrict a general maritime claim for
unseaworthiness.
Id. at 439–40.
As explained above, the Ninth Circuit in Batterton similarly
rejected McBride:
McBride, a sharply divided Fifth Circuit en banc decision,
holds that “punitive damages are non-pecuniary losses”
and therefore may not be recovered under the Jones Act
or under the general maritime law.…McBride has ive
extensive and scholarly opinions addressing all sides of
the question. Six dissenters note that Miles “addressed
the availability of loss of society damages to non-seamen
under general maritime law, not punitive damages,” and
that “Townsend announced the default rule that punitive
damages are available for actions under the general
maritime law (such as unseaworthiness).”
…
It is…true, as Dutra argues, that if we were to interpret
Miles broadly and Townsend narrowly, as the Fifth Circuit
has in McBride, then we might infer that Miles [prohibits
punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases]. But we
would then have to disregard Miles’s statement that the
Jones Act “does not disturb seamen’s general maritime
claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness.” The
Fifth Circuit’s leading opinions in McBride are scholarly
and carefully reasoned, but so are the dissenting
opinions, which to us are more persuasive.
880 F.3d at 1093, 1095–96 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, just as it had to decide in Townsend whether Miles
prohibited punitive damages for maintenance and cure claims,
now in Batterton the Court must decide whether Miles prohibits
punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.

SIGNIFICANCE
Punitive damages can greatly enhance a plaintiff’s recovery. Thus,
defendants routinely try to cut off a plaintiff’s ability to seek them.
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), however, the
Supreme Court, resolving a question that had been long debated,
held that punitive damages normally are available in maritime
cases. As a result, it ordered Exxon to pay $500 million in punitive
damages to the victims of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in
Alaska.
Given Baker and Townsend, as well as Evich, its own pre-Miles
precedent, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit ruled as it did
in Batterton. Nevertheless, McBride gives TDG hope, especially if
one accepts its idea that maintenance and cure is a distinct cause
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of action, while Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness simply
give injured seamen two bites at the same apple.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES

The numerous amicus briefs iled in support of TDG make it clear
just how eager marine employers are to win this case. Indeed,
while losing Townsend stung, losing Batterton would sting even
more. This is because punitive damages are easily avoided when
it comes to maintenance and cure claims. By simply paying the
plaintiff in a timely fashion, either with or without a “reservation
of rights,” the employer does not have to worry about punitive
damages. Moreover, as maintenance and cure claims are covered
by workers’ compensation, the employer, in a sense, has prepaid
them. And most maintenance and cure claims are relatively small.
This is especially true when it comes to maintenance, which
courts generally award at a rate of $20–$30 per day.

For Respondent Christopher Batterton (David C. Frederick,
202.326.7900)

Unseaworthiness claims, however, cannot be easily guarded
against. Moreover, when such a claim arises, an insurer may
decide that the shipowner’s action, or lack of action, has voided
the policy. Further, a jury is much more likely to award signiicant
punitive damages for a dangerous ship than for a mishandled
maintenance and cure payment.
As a result, the amicus briefs iled in support of TDG warn
that if the industry is forced to pay punitive damages for
unseaworthiness claims, maritime commerce will be disrupted,
litigation will increase, and the cost of waterborne goods will soar.
In contrast, Batterton insists that courts must be able to award
punitive damages to protect seamen from unscrupulous operators:
Petitioner advocates a per se rule that an injured seaman
can never recover punitive damages under the general
maritime law doctrine of unseaworthiness, no matter
how egregious a defendant shipowner’s fault may be.
Even if a shipowner made a callous decision to send a
doomed rust-bucket to sea in hopes of collecting on its
insurance policy, petitioner’s proposed rule would deny
sailors who survive the inevitable sinking of the vessel
their right under the general maritime law to seek
punitive damages—even for their employer’s deliberate
wrong-doing.
In a few months, we will know which of these arguments the
Supreme Court inds more compelling.

For Petitioner The Dutra Group (Seth P. Waxman, 202.663.6000)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner The Dutra Group
Alaskan Leader Fisheries LLC, et al. (Michael A. Barcott,
206.292.8008)
American Maritime Association, Inc. (Jane B. Jacobs,
212.935.6020)
At-Sea Processors Association, et al. (Evan M. Tager,
202.263.3000)
Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. (Kenneth G. Engerrand,
713.629.1580)
Dredging Contractors of America and Council for Dredging &
Marine Construction Safety (William P. Doyle, 202.737.2674)
Fishing Vessels’ Reserve, et al. (Michael J. Cummins,
415.348.6000)
International Association of Drilling Contractors (James T. Brown,
713.917.0888)
The American Waterways Operators (Barbara L. Holland,
206.464.3939)
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and
International Group of P & I Clubs (Scott A. Keller, 202.639.7700)
The Greater New Orleans Barge Fleeting Association, Inc. and
Offshore Marine Service Association (George J. Fowler III,
504.582.8000)
The Inland River Harbor and Fleeting Coalition (Neal W.
Settergren, 314.516.1700)
Waterways Council, Inc. (Don K. Haycraft, 504.581.7979)
In Support of Respondent Christopher Batteron
Injured Crewmembers (Michael F. Sturley, 512.232.1350)

Robert M. Jarvis is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern
University and a past editor of the Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce. He can be reached at jarvisb@nova.edu or
954.873.9173.
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